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In this discussion OLS regressions are used to study the factors that influence sovereign 
yield spreads and domestic bank indeces for a set of euro area countries. The results show 
that common factors explain changes in bank indeces better than in the yields.  Moreover, 
although there is some country differentiation, a common pattern among all is visible. A 
contemporary spillover effect between banks and sovereigns emerged after bank bailouts 
and became stronger with the burst of the sovereign debt crisis. The vicious cycle between 
the two has contributed to the escalation of spreads and to painful austerity measures. 
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Since the inception of the euro in 1999, the euro area has never faced a bigger 
challenge than the one posed by the sovereign debt crisis. The increasing debt and fear of 
default has led to rising bond yields in several Euro countries, putting an end to the 
convergence that was in place since the introduction of the single currency. At the same 
time there has been a banking crisis characterized by liquidity shortage and the struggle to 
meet capital requirements. The two are interconnected in several ways. On the one hand, in 
case of a sovereign default, banks that hold a significant fraction of debt from that country 
become insolvent and potentially bankrupt, thereby reducing credit to the private sector and 
endangering economic growth. Usually national banks are the most affected due to a home 
bias effect. According to EBA, domestic banks accounted for 71% of all banks' holdings of 
Italian government debt in June 2013, the same percentage as Portugal, while for Spain it 
was 89%. On the other hand, an undercapitalization of the banking system and the 
increasing probability of banks default have a negative effect over the output as banks 
engage in de-leveraging and reduce lending. With the aim to avoid a credit crunch and 
spillover effects over other financial institutions and sovereign credit as well as to 
safeguard its citizen’s deposits, governments may provide support to banks. However, the 
bailout decision usually comes at the cost of higher debt and often of higher taxes in the 
future. Therefore, the relationship between banks’ and sovereigns’ credit risk seems a 
vicious cycle. The recent past of Europe is the perfect illustration of this entanglement. A 
few examples are: the Irish decision to guarantee all debt of six of its biggest banks and the 
nationalization of Anglo Irish that pushed the budget deficit to 32 percent of GDP. As a 




EU, which came at the cost of austerity measures; the downgrade of 28 Spanish banks due 
to concerns over the country’s sovereign debt and souring real estate loans on June 2012; 
or, more recently, and shortly after Portugal exists bailout, the crisis in one of its biggest 
banks, BES, that pressured up Portuguese yields with contagion spreading to debt of other 
South Europe countries.  
The present paper seeks to shed further light on these issues, studying the relationship 
between banks and sovereigns before, during and after the 2008 financial crisis. In order to 
do that, OLS regressions will be estimated using sovereign yield spreads and the national 
bank indeces as dependent variables. The US yield, the US bank index, the VIX and the 
Euribor - Eonia spread are used as common factors. The countries under analysis are 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. The following broad 
conclusions were reached: (i) there is some country differentiation but a similar pattern 
exists; (ii) common factors explain bank index returns better than changes in yield spreads; 
(iii) bank indeces and yield spreads are negatively correlated and only became statistically 
significant in explaining one another after bank bailouts; (iv) with the sovereign debt crisis, 
a contemporaneous association between bank indeces and sovereign yield spreads is 
verified for all countries with both variables explaining one another - this is known in the 
literature as the feedback loop; (v) countries with high public debt-to-GDP ratios are more 
vulnerable to financial shocks. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 
2 presents some studies related to the research topic; section 3 contains the data, the sub-






2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
After the 2008 financial crisis, several academic papers have been written on the 
interdependence between banking and sovereign risk. Shambaugh (2012) discusses the 
Euro’s Three Crises - banking, sovereign debt and growth – and their interconnectedness, 
as well as some policies that can be adopted to face one crisis without damaging another. 
Fabio Panetta for Bank For International Settlements (2011) draws attention to the channels 
through which higher sovereign credit risk negatively affects bank funding such as the 
direct holding of government bonds, the decrease in the value of collateral that banks can 
use to raise funding, the decline of the value of government guarantees and the domestic 
banks downgrade that usually follows a similar movement in sovereign credit. Gennaioli, 
Martin, and Rossi (2014) show that on average banks hold a significant share of their assets 
in government bonds. For that reason, sovereign defaults tend to lead to severe disruptions 
in domestic credit markets, working as an incentive for governments to repay their debt. 
Gorea and Radev (2014) find evidence that the joint default probabilities of the Euro area 
countries are affected by the size, economic strength and real economy connections among 
sovereigns and that these effects are stronger during crisis periods. Mody and Sandri (2012) 
demonstrate that sovereign credit risk reflects the fragilities of the financial sector. In 
particular, after the Anglo Irish rescue, the financial sector index became 
contemporaneously associated with sovereign spreads, constituting the sovereign-bank 
feedback loop, which had a more severe impact on countries with high debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Alter and Beyer (2014) constructed a Contagion Index, concluding that contagion from 
banks to sovereigns and from sovereigns to banks increased during the period October 2009 




contagion as “a situation whereby instability in a specific market or institution is 
transmitted to one or several other markets or institutions.” Eichengreen et al. (2012) show 
that banks’ fortunes rise and fall together even in normal times. However, the importance of 
global factors reached unparalleled levels between the eruption of the Subprime Crisis and 
Lehman Brothers’ failure, as a consequence of the direct spillovers from the CDS spreads 
of U.S. banks to those of European banks. Black et al. (2013) constructed a hypothetical 
distress insurance premium as a measure of each banks’ systematic risk. Based on the 
measure created, the author concludes that there was an increasing systematic risk in 
Europe, first reflecting the spillover effects of the U.S. financial crisis, and later reaching its 
peak in November 2011 due to the increased sovereign default risk. Bedendo and Colla 
(2013) concluded that there was a contagion effect from sovereigns to firms, mainly due to 
the spillover of sovereigns to the financial sector, which consequently induced bank 
deleveraging affecting corporate lending.  
Other papers focused on the consequence of bank bailouts. Acharya et al. (2013), 
Ejsing and Lemke (2011) and Alter and Schüler (2012) find empirical evidence that 
bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk and that, post-bailout, there is a co-
movement between sovereign and financial CDS, with the former explaining the latter. 
Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff (2010) show that sovereign risk premia increase with the size of 
the banking sector during periods of financial turmoil, especially after the implementation 
of government guarantees. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizing (2010) concluded that the “too big 






3 DATA DESCRIPTION AND ECONOMETRIC APPROACH  
The focus of the present study is on the evolution of the European interdependence 
between the sovereign and financial sector. The majority of the literature on the theme uses 
CDS spreads as input. However, due to restriction of data before 2008, government bond 
yield spreads were used. In theory the results should be similar as the n-year CDS spread is 
equal to the yield on an n-year par yield bond minus the n-year risk-free rate. According to 
Hull et al (2004) this relationship usually holds. The sovereign spread for country “j” at 
time “t”,       in the context of this paper, is the difference between the sovereign yield of a 
5-year maturity bond and the yield on the 5-year German Bund. The spread is, therefore, 
the premium paid for the risk of default. Moreover, in order to capture spillovers from 
sovereigns to banks and from banks to sovereigns, domestic bank stock market indeces,      
were used as a proxy for the financial sector stress. The two main variables in study are 
inversely related as graphic 1 shows. The countries included in the analysis are Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Italy and Portugal. Germany is excluded because 
its yield is the benchmark risk-free. Ireland and Greece were also excluded due to 
restrictions on data for the yields.  All data were collected from Bloomberg except the bank 
indeces that were retrieved from Datastream.  
The sample starts on the first week of January 2003 and ends on the last week of June 
2014. It is divided into four distinct periods. The first period runs from the first week of 
January 2003 until the end of May 2007 and contains 228 observations after adjustments. 
This period is characterized by calm financial markets, convergence in yields and an 




ends in September 2008 consisting of 70 observations. It is characterized by turmoil in 
financial markets and by Lehman’s bankruptcy. Soon, financial stress was transmitted to 
European banks, and bank indeces plumped right after. The third period lasts from October 
2008 until the last week of November 2009, consisting of a total of 61 observations. This 
period is considered to investigate the immediate following effects of banks bailouts that 
took place in Europe. It started on 30 September 2008 with the Irish announcement to 
guarantee all debt of its six largest banks, followed by the Eurozone leaders’ draft 
declaration, on 13 October, that governments would guarantee bank loans and take stake in 
lenders. The fourth period starts in the first week of December 2009 and goes to the last 
week of June 2014 consisting of 239 observations. This last stage is regarded as the 
European sovereign debt crisis. 
To study the possible association between sovereign risk premium and the financial 
sector stress of each country, first consider the following OLS regressions:  
                             
 
   
                     
                         
 
   
                     
where     and     are the sovereign spread and the national bank index of country j at 
time t, respectively. The first lags of the dependent variables are considered to account for 
the possibility of persistence in the data. The    regressors include other factors that are 
expected to affect both yield spreads and bank indeces, such as the 5-year US yield, which 
in the model is used as a proxy for the assessment of global economic conditions. Slower 




treasury yields since US treasury bonds are considered safe assets; the US bank index, that 
works as a proxy for global financial conditions; the VIX, which is an indicator of 
investors’ risk aversion; and the spread between the 3-month EURIBOR and the 3-month 
EONIA which is an indicator of the credit risk banks perceive in one another. If the spread 
is widening, as in mid 2007 and 2008, credit risk increases and if it is shrinking the 
opposite applies. The relationship of key interest is considered by regressing sovereign 
yield spreads on bank indeces and the reverse. 
Some econometric considerations should be made when estimating the regressions. 
First, estimation is made using weekly data to smooth measurement error of daily 
frequencies. Secondly, market indeces are very volatile and in order to reduce the volatility 
of these series and the impact of outliers, estimation should be made using natural 
logarithms. Thirdly, unit root tests suggest that all variables considered in the regression are 
not stationary if considered in levels, but that they are difference-stationary. Taking these 
considerations into account, the specification to be estimated is:   
                               
 
   
                          
                                   
 
   
                       
Regarding the two dependent variables,      represents the change in the sovereign yield 
spread of country j, and         is the change in the natural logarithm of country j bank 
index.  
After defining the model, two econometric concerns arise: heteroskedasticity and 




not result in biased parameters estimates but, if ignored, the standard errors can be biased 
and, consequently, any inferences made can be misleading. Regarding autocorrelation, it 
means that errors are correlated with one another.  The consequence of ignoring it is similar 
to the one of heteroskedasticity, that is, it does not affect the unbiasedness or consistency of 
coefficient estimates but it does affect their efficiency. Under both concerns, the OLS 
estimates are no longer BLUE. When testing for heteroscedasticty and autocorrelation up to 
four lags, it was verified that the majority of the regressions often suffered from such 
problems. Therefore, when estimating the previous specification in the software E-views, if 
regressions exhibited heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation, estimation was made using 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix of the 
parameters. If that was not the case, then estimation default was applied. With all these 
considerations into account, the results are presented next. 
 
4 RESULTS  
This section intends to analyze the results of the OLS regressions mentioned in section 
3 (tables 1 to 8). First, the regressions where the dependent variable is the sovereign yield 
spread will be discussed and later, the regressions where the explained variable is the 
domestic bank index. 
In the first period considered, that is, before the onset of the financial crisis, the 
changes in sovereign spreads are not predicted by the variables considered, except for 
Portugal and for the Netherlands, and R-squares are small (table 1). This result is consistent 
with the literature that argues that before the crisis yield spreads are difficult to explain. 




countries’ risks such as debt levels, being this the reason for the convergence in yield 
spreads verified at the time. Regarding the exceptions, persistency in yield spreads occurs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
in the case of the Netherlands and Portugal, meaning that for these two countries and 
considering the interactions with the other explanatory variables, it was possible to predict 
changes in the yield spread through the use of its first lag. This contradicts the efficient 
market hypothesis that past returns do not explain current returns as prices follow a random 
pattern. However, the coefficient sign is negative, meaning that the spread tended first to 
overshoot and then to wince a bit. Moreover, the change in US yield spread significantly 
explains, at a 10% level, the changes in Portuguese spreads over the German Bund. Once 
again, the coefficient is negative which indicates that if global economic conditions are 
favorable the premium paid for the risk of Portugal’s default is lower.  
In the second period, which goes from June 2007 until late September 2008 which 
corresponds to the beginning of the financial crisis, yield spreads began to rise as investors 
started to evaluate more countries’ credit risk. During this stage, it would be expected that 
the US bank index would be a significant variable representing the financial turmoil that 
took place in that country and that soon was transmitted to Europe; however, that happens 
only for Belgium (table 2). Nevertheless, the significance of the Euribor-Eonia spread 
increased for all countries, reflecting the escalation of risk that European banks perceived in 
one another. In order to test that this latter variable was not absorbing the effect of the 
former, a regression that does not include the Euribor-Eonia spread was estimated and the 
results still hold. Comparing with period one, the R-squares increased for six of the seven 
countries under analysis, reflecting a higher explanatory power during this period than in 




The change in US yield is significant for Italy. Similarly to Portugal in the previous phase, 
the sign is negative, meaning that if the global economic environment worsens, the Italian 
spread will increase. Although at this stage Portugal and Spain do not have any statistically 
significant variables, the significance of the change in US bank index, the VIX and the 
Euribor-Eonia spread increased, reflecting the growing importance of financial global 
factors at this point.  
In the third period, which lasts from October 2008 until November 2009, the Euribor-
Eonia spread lost its significance (except for Italy) while the first lag and lag zero of 
domestic bank indeces had the opposite behavior for the majority of countries (table 3). 
This result is consistent with the literature that argues that bailouts achieved their main goal 
of bringing stability to the financial sector, but at the cost of a risk transfer to the 
government balance sheet. The contemporaneous lag of domestic bank indeces for Italy and 
France became statistically significant. This result can be explained by the specific 
measures that these two countries took to help national banks. In October 2008, the French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the state would set up a fund of 40 billion euros 
to help recapitalise banks in difficulty and guarantee 320 billion euros of bank debt. At the 
same time, the Italian Finance Minister Guido Tremonti announced that the government 
would guarantee some bank debt and buy preferred stocks if needed. Moreover, the US 
yield increased its significance for all countries, meaning that external economic news were 
particularly relevant during this fragile phase for Europe. It is interesting to notice that for 
Italy, the significance of all variables increased, probably translating the risk of this specific 
country due to its high level of public debt. Furthermore, it was during this stage that yield 




Finally the last period which starts in December 2009 and goes until the end of June 
2014 concerns the European sovereign debt crisis. This period of turbulence in the euro 
area sovereign bond markets was mainly triggered by Greece’s unhealthy public finance 
situation. The concerns over a Greek default soon spilled over to other euro area countries 
with poor economic performance such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland. Consequently, 
sovereign spreads differentials were very large at this point in time. Looking at the 
regressions (table 4), the most visible effect of this period is the fact that domestic bank 
indeces became highly significant in explaining yield spread changes for all countries - 
except the Netherlands for which it is almost significant at 10%. In other words, for all 
countries, sovereign yield spreads reflected equity losses in their national stock market 
bank indeces. However, and despite the fact that EU governments took actions based on the 
same policy of bailing out their national banking system, while equity losses for six of the 
countries under analysis are reflected on a sovereign yield spread increase, for France it 
was translated in a lower spread. Furthermore, the coefficients are quite big in absolute 
value and especially for countries with high debt-to-GDP, suggesting that they are more 
vulnerable to financial shocks. For instance, if the Portuguese bank index increases by one 
point, the yield spread will decrease by 0.11%. In addition, it is also interesting to notice 
that the domestic bank index and its first lag often have opposite signs, not only during this 
particular stage, but also in the previous ones. This pattern can be explained by the own 
volatility of bank indeces or because the market is still trying to understand how the 
financial sector stress affects public debt levels and sovereign yields. Besides, Spain, 
France and Belgium show some persistence in the change in yields, while the volatility 




a positive sign. R-squares at this stage are quite high, except for the Netherlands, for which 
the only statistically variable is the change in US bank index.  
As for the regressions where the regressand is the domestic bank index (tables 5 to 8), 
it is clear, when comparing to the previous ones, that common factors are more important in 
explaining changes in domestic bank indeces than sovereign yield spreads for the four 
different periods. The next paragraphs will analyze each different phase, similarly to what 
was done before. 
Prior to the financial crisis, investors’ risk aversion significantly explained returns of 
European bank indeces (table 5), except for Portugal since it is the country under analysis 
that has lowest correlation between the VIX and the domestic bank index. The coefficients’ 
signs are negative as during volatile periods investors often pull out of the market and 
invest in safer assets. The changes in the US bank index and in US yield are significant for 
five of the seven countries - Portugal and Austria excluded - and the sign of both regressors 
are positive for all. Regarding the first case, if the American bank index exhibits a positive 
or negative trend it is likely that this behavior spills over to the European banking markets. 
In what concerns the second variable, investing in the banking sector was considered quite 
safe before the financial crisis, and so it is likely that bank indeces were trending upwards if 
global economy was not showing signs of slowdown. Moreover, the national factors 
considered often had influence on bank indeces before the crisis. First, because the first lag 
of the Portuguese bank index explains the contemporaneous one. This result does not 
contradict the financial theory as it is possible to obtain some predictive power for stock 
returns based on previous returns, when stocks are considered in aggregate. Secondly, 




Belgian and Dutch bank stock returns. It is interesting to notice that while in period one of 
the previous set of regressions, changes in bank indeces do not significantly explain the 
dependent variable, which is the change in sovereign spread (table 1), here the opposite 
holds for the three countries mentioned. While Spain and Belgium suffered a sovereign 
credit rating upgrade during this period, the Netherlands maintained its AAA rating, 
according to Fitch. The negative signs of the coefficients confirm the usual negative 
relationship between the two variables. The considerable lower R-squares of Portugal and 
Austria, when compared to the rest of the countries, can be explained by the fact that other 
factors outside the model better account for the change in the domestic bank index at the 
time. In the case of Portugal, one possible reason is the importance of domestic effects such 
as the 2003 economic recession, low productivity growth, the large current account deficit 
or bank concentration. As for Austria, its banks experienced a very rapid expansion in 
Western Europe between 2003 and 2007 through the acquisition of local banks that were 
privatized. According to the IMF, by 2007 the foreign claims of Austrian banks on Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe had increased from 10 percent of GDP in 2003 to 70 
percent of GDP. The R-squares of the first stage are much higher when the responding 
variable is bank indeces rather than sovereign yield spreads.  
With the outbreak of the financial crisis, investors’ risk aversion became significant for 
all countries (table 6). As it is common during periods of financial turbulence, the volatility 
index jumped while bank indeces dropped sharply. Changes in US bank index are now 
significant for all countries except for Portugal. Contrary to the previous phase, US yield 
does not significantly influence bank indeces returns, with the exception of Austria. Note 




countries and is negative for all of them in the next phase. This means that as the crisis 
evolved, investing in bank stocks was not considered safe anymore. Moreover, the fact that 
US yield lost part of its importance after the crisis indicates that financial factors had a 
much greater impact on bank indeces and that pure economic issues fell behind. Persistency 
still remains significant for Portugal. In addition, the first lag of changes in domestic yield 
spread is significant for France. One common characteristic of this period is that for all 
countries, and not only for France, sovereign spreads rose as a consequence of the financial 
turbulence that hit Europe. Excluding the period right after Bear Stearns’ rescue, they 
exhibit an upward trend, while bank indexes show the opposite behavior. Similarly to what 
happened in the previous estimations, the predictive power at this phase is higher than the 
first one. 
After bailouts, and identically to what happened at this point in time when the 
regressand was the change in spreads but on the opposite direction, change in yield spreads 
contemporaneously affects variation in the domestic bank index for Italy and France (table 
7). This is consistent with the economic view that after bailouts yield spreads were 
influenced by the financial sector stress, since proving state help to banks increased public 
debt levels. On the reverse side, bank indeces started to be affected by sovereign credit risk 
due to both the direct holding of domestic sovereign bonds and the dependence on state 
guarantees. Note also that in the previous period it was the past lag that was significant for 
France, meaning that as the crisis evolved, the French bank index started to incorporate the 
information of the public finances sooner. For the remaining countries, the relationship 
between changes in yield spreads and bank indeces became stronger after bailouts, although 




financial conditions and investors’ risk aversion still influence bank stock returns, while the 
credit risk that Euro zone banks perceive in one another significantly explains bank stock 
returns for Portugal and Austria. This later result shows that despite bailouts had transfer 
some risk from the banking sector to the government, the market was still afraid of a 
negative spillover effect among banks and, more broadly, of the risk of a bank default. 
Also, the first lag of domestic bank index is significant for Belgium. 
Regarding the period of the debt crisis, the persistence of the dependent variable is 
significant for Portugal instead of Belgium and the variations in US bank index and the 
VIX still remain as variables that explain the changes in domestic bank indeces (table 8). 
However, the main difference to the previous stages is that, for all countries, yield spread 
changes contemporaneously affect the variations in the domestic bank indeces. The fact 
that countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy have the smallest coefficients in absolute 
values might be explained by the high volatily of domestic yields during this period when 
compared to the other countries. Additionally, this result do not necessarily imply that 
bailouts had a greater impact on countries such as France, Austria and Belgium, otherwise 
the feedback loop theory does not perfectly hold since in table 4 the countries for which 
bank indeces mostly affect sovereign spreads are the first set of countries and not the 
second ones. The Netherlands, the country that in the last three years has had the lowest 
government debt among the seven, is the one that tends to show less evidence of the 
relationship between banks and sovereigns. The R-squares at this stage are considerably 




5 CONCLUSION  
 The 2008 financial crisis had its origins in the US and soon spread its tentacles over 
Europe. Today, more than six years later, we are still daily bombarded by news of banks in 
trouble and the social consequences of austerity measures. The present work aimed at 
studying the factors that affect the behavior of sovereigns’ and banks’ returns and the 
feedback loop between the two. With this end in mind, two different OLS regressions were 
estimated for seven Euro area countries: regressions where the explained variable is the 
sovereign yield spread and regressions where the dependent variable is the domestic bank 
index. Both have as regressors the first lag of the explained variable, the dependent variable 
of the other regression, and a set of common factors that are likely to influence both 
sovereign yield spreads and domestic bank indexes, namely global economic environment, 
global financial conditions, investors’ risk aversion and the perceived lending risk among 
Euro area banks. These two regressions were then estimated for four different periods of 
study: the first one, before the financial turmoil; the second, during the outburst of the 
crisis; the third, when the influence of bank bailouts started being felt; and the fourth, the 
persistence of the sovereign debt crisis. 
Results show that sovereign yield spreads are particularly difficult to predict, although 
the explanatory power increased after the eruption of the financial crisis, as the credit risk 
that banks perceive in one another became a significant factor. All other common factors 
considered did not have a clear effect over sovereign spreads across countries and across 
the four different time periods, contrary to when the regressand is the bank index. The two 
key variables of study are negatively correlated, but only after bank bailouts they became 




with high debt-to-GDP ratios are more vulnerable to financial shocks. The 
contemporaneous relationship between the banking and the public sectors during the 
sovereign debt crisis can be explained by the higher debt burden for governments, which 
resulted directly from the guarantees provided to banks. This, in turn, feeds back to banks 
since a negative shock decreases sovereigns’ credit worthiness and affects banks through 
the direct holding of sovereign bonds or through the guarantees provided by governments. 
Therefore, any fear about a sovereign default is translated into the banking sector. This loop 
has greatly contributed to the rise of sovereign yield spreads and yield differentials among 
Euro area countries, a burden which was especially felt between 2011 and 2013, but that 
still persists.  
Policy makers are taking actions in order to break the link between banks and 
sovereigns given the threat that it represents to the European project. In an effort to prevent 
the boat from sinking, EU institutions designed a banking union that consists of a common 
banking supervisor (the ECB), a financial mechanism to directly recapitalize banks in 
Europe, and a common deposit guarantee up to a limit of 100,000 euros. However, whether 
the Banking Union will be able to achieve this or not depends on the ability of the Asset 
Quality Review and of stress tests to evaluate banks’ assets and collateral and to force 
corrective measures if needed. Moreover, it also seems crucial that European authorities 
take steps towards promoting growth in order to diminish debt-to-GDP and, consequently, 
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Graphic 1 – The negative relationship between the 5-year yield spread over the 
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Table 6 – Change in domestic bank indeces: June 2007 - September 2008 
 
 





Table 8 – Change in domestic bank indeces:  December 2009 – June 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
